![]() ![]() ![]() "Management did not feel it was doing a bad job, but thought the unique demands of nuclear propulsion were the main source of the difficulties. It was hard to find anyone who had a complete picture of the work to be done. The material control system was antiquated, responsibility was fragmented, and communication between levels of management was poor. Quincy personnel appeared to be lower in caliber, competence, and potential than to those of other yards. Several times he had complained to the management about the shortage of competent engineers and the lack of aggressive supervisory personnel, but corrective actions had been sporadic and short-lived. He thought the cost of the work high and the accounting practices lax. For comparison, only one of the six Skipjack-class submarines was lost due to an accident, and only two US nuclear subs (the Skipjack-class Scorpion with 99 aboard and the Permit-class Thresher with 125 aboard) have been lost - neither due to nuclear problems.įrancis Duncan wrote in "Rickover and the Nuclear Navy" " Over the years Quincy had gotten a poor reputation for its work, labor relations, material control, and management. In addition, US reactor designs were safer: four of the fourteen November-class boats were lost due to reactor accidents. Skipjack-class submarines were 251 feet long, 31.8 feet wide, drew 27 feet, and displaced 3,515 feet submerged. The November was 352 feet long, had 26.1-foot beam, drew 21.1 feet, and displaced 4,069 tons submerged. The Soviet November-class was roughly contemporary with the U.S. Industry representatives, who supported A.P.Aleksandrov, believed that the submarine should be immediately transferred to the Navy in trial operation, during which the sailors have mastered the craft, and the disadvantages would be eliminated by the industry as they were identified. Navy representatives insisted on a version which provided for full testing of the equipment by industrial enterprises, replacing unreliable and defective assemblies and mechanisms, as well as conducting the first test replacement reactor cores, and only after this transfer of Navy submarines. As a result, at the signing of the "Act of the government commission" opinion sailors and ship builders of submarine transmission order "K-3" fleet was divided. ![]() This has a negative impact on the reputation of the submarine fleet.ĭuring the tests there were revealed various drawbacks, regarding the construction completion and finishing machinery. After a few hundred hours of operations, there arose in the steam generators tube bundles microscopic cracks through which water from the primary circuit leaked into the second loop, increasing the level of radioactivity in it.Īs a result, the whole burden of armed conflict at sea, including during the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962, fell to diesel submarines. The reason for this lay in the first place in low resources of the main power plant steam generators. Originally the reliability of boats of the "627 Kit" and 627A was relatively low. ![]() The construction of the K-3 took part the whole country, but most participants did not even know about it, and coordination of multi-enterprise projects was historically a major challenge under the Soviet system. Crew members did not reveal serious problems in a submarine, because of the fear of punishment. Although Soviet technology was comparable that of the West, Soviet doctrine and bureaucracy held the submariners from performing at their potential capabilities. The remaining Project 627 and 627A class submarines were decommissioned between 19. Several units of this class suffered reactor accidents. ![]()
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